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In April 2006, the state of Massachusetts 
passed landmark health reform legisla-
tion.1 Once fully implemented, the vari-
ous components of the law are intended 
to bring the state close to universal 
coverage. This brief reviews the cur-
rent status of the reform, summarizing 
significant accomplishments to date as 
well as the challenges faced in the near 
term and longer term. 
The Massachusetts reform in many ways 
has become the model for the nation. 
The plans President-elect Obama and 
Senator Hillary Clinton espoused dur-
ing the presidential primary campaign 
and the principles Senator Baucus 
announced are all derived to some 
degree from the Massachusetts experi-
ence.2 The common features include an 
expansion of Medicaid, income-related 
subsidies, a purchasing arrangement, an 
employer assessment, and an individual 
mandate (in the Obama plan, only for 
children). It is reasonable to believe that 
any health reform enacted along these 
lines could achieve similar successes and 
would face similar problems as those ex-
perienced in Massachusetts. This paper 
is intended to contribute to the national 
health reform debate and continuing 
policy debates in Massachusetts. 
The Reforms 
The law, Chapter 58 of the Acts of 
2006, titled “An Act Providing Access 
to Affordable, Quality,  Accountable 
Health Care,” expanded Medicaid 
(called MassHealth in Massachusetts) for 
children up to 300 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) and restored coverage 
of certain adult groups where enrollment 
had been frozen. It established the 
Commonwealth Connector, a quasi-
public entity, described more fully 
below, to organize the market and make 
affordable insurance products available. 
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Summary
Many of the features included in the Massachusetts health reform law, passed 
in early 2006, are being discussed as part of national reform. This paper is 
intended to inform the national debate and ongoing work in Massachusetts. 
To date, the Massachusetts reform has had positive impacts on insurance 
coverage and access to medical care. The number of uninsured has fallen by 
more than half — with no evidence that subsidized coverage has “crowded out” 
private insurance. Unmet needs for a range of medical services have dropped, 
as have financial burdens associated with health care. 
While the program has seen rapid enrollment, it has also seen higher than 
anticipated costs. Some of the cost problems are short term and should not be 
surprising for a major new initiative. But Massachusetts also faces a long-term 
cost problem. 
Massachusetts’ overall health care spending is higher than the national average 
and has grown more rapidly. We believe much of Massachusetts’ high spend-
ing growth is due to problems in the hospital/physician market. The market 
is highly concentrated with several academic medical centers, most notably the 
Partners’ Health System, being the dominant providers in local markets. While 
these academic medical centers typically have excellent reputations, they are 
also high-cost. Efforts by insurers to negotiate with the leading academic cen-
ters have proven difficult, if not impossible.
The problem of limited competition makes it extremely difficult for the state 
to address the growth in health care costs. If health care costs cannot be 
controlled, more and more people will become exempt from the individual 
mandate, and the cost of both Medicaid and low-income subsidies will increase. 
At stake ultimately is whether the Massachusetts reforms can survive.
We propose four options for addressing the long-term cost issues. The first op-
tion is to expand the managed competition model, and we suggest ways to do 
this. The second is to develop a public plan to compete with other insurers in 
the market and negotiate more effectively with providers. The third is to have 
the Connector negotiate on behalf of all CommCare and CommChoice plans 
over hospital and physician rates. The fourth is to develop an all-payer rate-
setting system; all payers other than Medicare would use these rates, and they 
would apply to all providers.
Last, we suggest that Massachusetts take the final steps toward universal 
coverage by extending its mandate to children, restructuring subsidies to help 
more people, and addressing equity problems.
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The Connector provides insurance 
options on a subsidized basis for low-
income adults and on an unsubsidized 
basis for small employers (not yet fully 
implemented) and higher income adults 
(through the new Commonwealth 
Choice or CommChoice program). The 
legislation placed a small assessment on 
employers with 10 or more employees 
who do not provide coverage or make 
a “fair and reasonable” contribution 
toward that coverage. It also requires 
those employers to offer a Section 125 or 
cafeteria plan. Finally, the law imposed 
a mandate on all adults to obtain 
coverage if there is an affordable product 
available to them. The law also merged 
the small employer and individual 
private insurance markets to bring 
down premiums in the latter with small 
increases in the former. The reforms 
have been phased in over the past two 
years, with nearly all components now  
in place.3
The Connector is a key component 
of the reforms. Its board has a major 
policymaking role in establishing the 
standards for affordable health coverage, 
the subsidy schedule for the CommCare 
program, and for the specific elements 
required for insurance coverage 
to satisfy the individual mandate 
provisions (termed “minimum creditable 
coverage”), as well as responsibility 
for operating the two new programs 
under health reform—CommCare and 
CommChoice.4 
CommChoice is open to individuals and, 
in 2009, to firms with fewer than 50 
workers. CommCare is available to adults 
with family incomes below 300 percent 
of the FPL who do not have access to 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). 
CommCare provides coverage through 
private managed care plans, which 
include comprehensive benefits, no 
deductibles, and limited cost sharing that 
increases with income. Premiums are 
free to those with income below 150 per-
cent of the FPL, and are modest for those 
between 150 and 300 percent of the FPL, 
increasing with income. The premiums 
charged to CommCare enrollees are 
consistent with the affordability sched-
ule established by the Connector board. 
All individuals eligible for CommCare 
are deemed to have affordable coverage 
available to them, and hence are subject 
to the individual mandate. 
The affordability schedule is also used 
to determine whether an individual 
with income above 300 percent of FPL 
is subject to the mandate. If a policy 
that meets the affordability standard 
as well as the minimum creditable 
coverage provisions is not available, 
the individual is not required to enroll 
in an insurance plan. Unsubsidized 
coverage for all individuals seeking to 
purchase coverage directly is available 
through private plans. Those insurers 
participating in CommChoice must offer 
four different plans with actuarial values 
that are determined by the Connector 
Board.5 The bronze plans have the lowest 
actuarial values of the three main plans, 
and those typically have deductibles of 
$2,000 for single coverage and $4,000 
for family coverage. The silver and gold 
plans require less cost sharing; gold 
plans have no deductibles and small co-
payments. The fourth actuarial level is 
available only to young adult purchasers. 
Since the plan levels (bronze, silver, 
gold, young adult) are set according to 
actuarial value standards as opposed to 
uniform benefit and cost-sharing designs, 
plans at the same level can have different 
benefits and cost-sharing requirements. 
All of the Connector plans, including 
the bronze and young adult plans (YAP), 
satisfy the requirements of the individual 
mandate and if their premiums exceed the 
affordability standard for an individual’s 
income, that person is not required to 
purchase coverage. Individuals can also 
purchase coverage through employers, 
if such an offer is available to them, or 
through the private nongroup insurance 
market that continues to operate outside  
of the Connector. 
Massachusetts health reform has been 
praised by many observers and has 
been seen as a model for health reform 
in other states and nationally. It has 
received praise for the bipartisan support 
with which it was enacted and the 
speed of its implementation. Specifically, 
the work of the Connector board and 
staff have received high marks for 
establishing policies on affordability and 
the benefit package, negotiating rates 
with health plans, and the speed with 
which enrollment expanded. But it has 
also faced a barrage of criticism. It has 
been criticized by those who believe 
Massachusetts will fall short of universal 
coverage because the mandate will be 
ineffective, and that the reform structure 
is overregulated and overly prescriptive, 
particularly with respect to the benefit 
package.6 Another criticism has been 
that the program’s premiums are too 
high, leading to a significant number of 
people being exempt from the mandate.7 
Further it has been argued that there 
are no mechanisms in the program to 
control cost growth over time, thus 
the reform will prove unsustainable.8 
Criticism over the cost problems facing 
the state have been the frequent source 
of articles in the Boston Globe, the Wall 
Street Journal and the New York Times.9
Accomplishments to Date
The Massachusetts reforms have already 
had significant and positive effects 
on insurance coverage and access to 
medical care. The state reports that, 
as of August 2008, 439,000 people are 
newly insured.10 Since April 2006, 72,000 
people have been added to MassHealth 
and 176,000 to CommCare.11 The 
remainder of the newly insured have 
new private coverage. There has been 
a reduction of 37 percent in the volume 
of care provided by the Free Care Pool 
and 41 percent in payments made by the 
Pool.12 The four MassHealth managed 
care plans have actively competed for 
CommCare enrollees. 
Six insurers offer bronze, silver, and 
gold, as well as young adult policies, to 
CommChoice enrollees.13 CommChoice 
has been available since July 2007 but to 
date has only about 18,000 enrollees who 
purchase through the Connector;14 this 
is expected to increase as the penalty 
for remaining uninsured is increased 
this year. Another roughly 14,000 are 
now buying coverage directly from 
carriers.15 The individual mandate seems 
to be fairly effective thus far. Based on 
tax filings as of April 2008, only 97,000 
uninsured adults had affordable coverage 
and were thus subject to the mandate in 
2007 but chose to remain uninsured and 
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pay the penalty.16 This number is likely to 
decline sharply as the penalties increase 
this year. A reported 69,000 individuals 
were deemed to be exempt from the 
mandate because they did not have 
access to an affordable health plan.17 
In a recent study published in the 
journal Health Affairs, Urban Institute 
researcher Sharon Long reported 
extensive survey results showing the 
impacts of the new program.18 Long 
conducted two surveys, the first in 
the fall of 2006, before most of the 
provisions were enacted, and the second 
in the fall of 2007. By the fall of 2007, the 
MassHealth expansion had occurred and 
CommCare and CommChoice were in 
place; however, the individual mandate 
had just been introduced and uninsured 
individuals had not yet been assessed 
the small 2007 tax penalty for failure to 
comply with the mandate. 
Long reported that uninsurance among 
adults in Massachusetts dropped from 
13 to 7 percent after reform. The 
uninsured rate fell from 24 to 13 percent 
among low-income adults (those with 
incomes below 300 percent of the FPL). 
The uninsured rate also fell for higher 
income adults, from 5 to 3 percent. The 
uninsured rate fell sharply among males 
from 18 to 9 percent and from 9 to 6 
percent for females. The uninsured rate 
also fell dramatically for young adults, 
from 23 to 13 percent, while falling for 
other age groups as well.19 
It is especially noteworthy that there 
was no evidence of subsidized insurance 
“crowding out” private insurance 
coverage.20 The percentage of low-
income people receiving coverage 
through their employers increased from 
38 to 42 percent. While some had been 
concerned that private coverage could 
decline post-reform, the legislation did 
not create incentives for employers to 
stop offering insurance to their workers 
or for workers to stop taking it up. 
Employers offered coverage prior to 
the legislation without a mandate, thus 
there would be no reason to expect 
a decline when a small penalty was 
introduced for not providing coverage. 
In fact, as we predicted elsewhere, a 
properly designed individual mandate 
can increase the share of employers 
offering coverage, since workers would 
be seeking the most efficient avenues 
for satisfying the mandate.21 The law 
also likely encourages employees to 
take up an offer of employer coverage. 
Additionally, there is no eligibility for 
CommCare if one is eligible for ESI and 
no eligibility for CommCare for six 
months if one’s employer stops offering 
coverage, both provisions significantly 
decreasing the value of leaving employer-
based insurance.
Long also found important improve-
ments in access to care. There were post-
reform increases in the percentages of 
people having a usual source of care, in 
the percent with preventive care visits, 
and in the percent with dental visits. 
There were lower levels of unmet need 
due to cost burdens, falling from 36 to 
30 percent of low-income adults, with 
declines in unmet need due to cost for 
physicians, specialists, preventive care, 
tests, drugs, and dental care. The study 
did find that slightly more low-income 
people reported unmet need due to 
trouble finding a provider who would 
see them or trouble getting an appoint-
ment, increasing from 4 to 7 percent, a 
suggestion that provider supply may be 
insufficient to meet demand in certain 
geographic areas. Finally, Long found a 
substantial drop in out-of-pocket costs 
and a decline in the percentage of 
people reporting difficulty paying medi-
cal care expenses. 
Further, the public support for 
Massachusetts health reform has stayed 
high; over 70 percent of the public 
continues to support health reform.22 
Moreover, the broad base coalition of 
Democrats and Republicans that voted 
to enact the legislation has remained 
supportive. This is critical in helping  
the state deal with difficult issues as  
they arise.
Costs—The Short-Term 
Problem
While the results on coverage and access 
are highly promising, the issue of the 
rising cost of the program is receiving 
increasing attention, typically negative, 
with some suggesting that spending is 
out of control and that the program is 
doomed to failure. There is considerable 
debate about the extent of this problem 
and its causes. Table 1 provides data 
from numerous sources that have been 
Table 1. CommCare Enrollment and Expenditures
Enrollment c,d
(enrollees)
Conference 
Committee 
Projectionsa
(in millions)
Funding or 
Requested Budget  
for Fiscal Yearb
(in millions)
Actual Costs or 
Current Projectionsb
(in millions)
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts Information 
Statement Projectionsc
(millions, actual or projected)
FY2007 132,919d $ 160 $ 133 $   133
FY2008 175,617c $ 400 $ 472 $ 625    $   647.9
FY2009 255,000c $ 725 $ 869 $1,082e
a http://www.aishealth.com/HealthReform/State_Massachusetts.html
b Health Connector Facts and Figures, May 2008
c Commonwealth of Massachusetts Information Statement, April 16, 2008, Linked from http://blog.hcfama.org/?p=1619
d “Revisiting Massachusetts Health Reform: 18 Months Later,” December 2007, Community Catalyst
e This figure is an over-estimate as it was based on assumed enrollment increases in CommCare that are no longer expected to materialize. 
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repeatedly cited in the press to show 
the extent of the current spending 
problem. The original estimate when 
the legislation was enacted was that the 
program would cost $160 million in FY 
2007, $400 million in FY 2008 and $725 
million in FY 2009.23 Actual costs seem 
to have been lower in FY 2007, $133 
million, but have increased rapidly since 
then, substantially more than what had 
originally been projected.24 The $625 
million in FY 2008 was considerably 
in excess of the amount that had been 
requested in the budget for 2008.25 The 
amount requested for fiscal 2009 is $869 
million.26 Another source projected that 
this could increase to as much as $1.1 
billion,27 but that was based on assumed 
enrollment increases in CommCare that 
are no longer expected to materialize.
There are several reasons for the higher 
than expected costs of the program. 
First, there has been much higher 
enrollment in subsidized programs 
than had been expected. Enrollment 
growth has increased tremendously 
over the period, from 132,900 enrollees 
in CommCare in FY 2007 to 175,600 in 
2008.28 It is estimated that there are now 
250,000 new enrollees in MassHealth or 
in CommCare. In part, the surprisingly 
high number reflects the fact that early 
estimates relied on the state’s household 
insurance survey, a telephone survey 
of households. It seems clear that the 
survey underestimated the size of the 
population below 300 percent FPL 
and the number of uninsured people. 
The state survey projected 370,000 
uninsured people in 2006, compared 
to a projection of 530,000 uninsured 
based on analyses using the Current 
Population Survey conducted by the 
Urban Institute.29 (Massachusetts 
has subsequently contracted with 
the Urban Institute to develop and 
implement a new survey, which has 
recently completed its first round.30) The 
underestimate of both the number of 
uninsured and the number of people in 
the income range eligible for subsidies 
based on the earlier survey has been a 
major factor in the unexpected size of 
enrollment in CommCare. 
But there are other factors as well. The 
subsidy schedule that was eventually 
agreed upon by the Connector Board 
was more generous than had originally 
been anticipated. Full premium 
subsidies were made available to 
those below 150 percent of the FPL 
(as opposed to 100 percent) and the 
amount people were deemed able 
to pay for health insurance, i.e., the 
affordability schedule, increased 
relatively slowly as income increased, 
shifting more costs to the government 
than had originally been anticipated. 
Next, there appears to have been some 
adverse selection into CommCare. 
Those uninsured who enrolled in 
the first year were less healthy than 
the overall uninsured population.31 
There has also been a disproportionate 
share of those who have signed up 
for CommCare who are eligible for 
full subsidies as opposed to a more 
even spreading of enrollment among 
those who are both fully and partially 
subsidized.32 Cost data provided by 
the Connector support the view that 
increases in the cost of CommCare are 
a function of enrollment growth.33 The 
Connector provides data that show 
that per member per month costs have 
been relatively flat between 2007 and 
2008, and that projections for premium 
growth in 2009 are just under 4 percent. 
There are similar findings with regard to 
CommChoice where premium increases 
have averaged about 5 percent. These 
low rates of increase are consistent with 
the discussion above, e.g., the early 
enrollment of less healthy and lower 
income (CommCare) people followed by 
enrollment of those who are healthier. 
All of these problems are likely to 
be short-term in nature and should 
not be surprising for a major new 
initiative. Enrollment will continue to 
increase, but the underlying numbers 
of uninsured and low-income people 
are now better understood.34 While 
the initial enrollment resulted in some 
adverse selection, the next round of 
enrollment increases that will occur 
because of the mandate will likely be 
largely from healthier enrollees, slowing 
the increase in the average cost of 
CommCare plans. Government costs 
associated with new enrollees will be 
lower than the average for the initial 
enrollees because the new entrants will 
be higher income on average and thus 
required to pay some of the premiums. 
This would explain the modest 
increases in CommCare premiums.
Costs—The Long-Term 
Problem
The Massachusetts reform, however, 
also faces a long-term cost problem. 
Part of this stems from the fact that 
the Massachusetts plan was partially 
financed with (and depends on) federal 
funds through a Medicaid waiver. 
These funds came into the state in 
various ways, but their main objective 
was to support safety net providers. 
Under the waiver agreement in 2005, 
these funds were to be reallocated and 
used to finance the subsidies for the 
purchase of insurance in CommCare. 
In the original waiver agreement, the 
federal government provided $16.9 
billion dollars over three years to the 
financing of reform. A major issue in 
Massachusetts has been whether this 
waiver would be renewed. Without 
renewal, the viability of the reform was 
in doubt. On September 30, 2008, the 
federal government agreed in principle 
to a renewal of the waiver, increasing 
the amount of waiver funds to $21.2 
billion over three years retroactive to 
July 1, 2008. The money will allow the 
state to continue funding CommCare 
subsidies as well as to fund the residual 
safety net “free care” pool. 
But the broader problem is that the 
state’s overall health care spending 
on a per capita basis is substantially 
higher than the national average and has 
recently been growing more quickly. 
Data compiled by the Massachusetts 
Division of Health Care Finance and 
Policy and presented on February 6, 
2008,35 showed that: 
Massachusetts’ health spending •	
increased by 34.7 percent between 
2000 and 2004, or 7.7 percent per 
year. Health spending more than 
doubled between 1991 and 2004. 
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Massachusetts’ per capita income 
between 2000 and 2004 increased at 
an average rate of 1.0 percent per year.
On a per capita basis, health spending •	
is more than 26 percent higher in 
Massachusetts than in the United 
States as a whole and grew somewhat 
faster between 1991 and 2004. 
Spending in Massachusetts increased 
from $3,249 per capita in 1991 to 
$6,683 per capita in 2004. The 
comparable numbers for the United 
States as a whole were $2,654 in 1991 
and $5,283 in 2004. A small share of 
the higher Massachusetts spending is 
due to medical research.
Hospital expenditures accounted •	
for half of the difference between 
Massachusetts and U.S. per capita 
health spending. Of the difference of 
$1,400 in per capita spending, $689 
was attributable to differences in 
hospital spending per capita. 
Hospital care also accounted for a •	
larger share of spending increases 
in Massachusetts than in the United 
States. Between 2000 and 2004, hospi-
tal spending accounted for 45 percent 
of health care expenditure increases 
in Massachusetts. In the United States, 
hospital spending accounted for 36 
percent of the spending increase be-
tween 2000 and 2004. 
While health care spending increased •	
by 33 percent between 2000 and 2004 
in Massachusetts, health insurance 
premiums increased by 53 percent for 
individual policies and 44 percent for 
family policies. 
Health insurance premiums •	
increased by 8.9 percent per year in 
Massachusetts between 2001 and 
2007, faster than the U.S. average 
growth in premiums of 7.7 percent. 
These data clearly show that health 
spending in Massachusetts is higher 
than the United States on average and 
is growing at a faster rate. Furthermore, 
health insurance premiums are grow-
ing even faster than health care costs in 
the state. Finally, hospitals account for a 
larger share of health spending in Mas-
sachusetts than in the rest of the United 
States. While these data are a bit old, 
some more recent data suggest these 
trends are continuing. For example, data 
from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey – Insurance Component (MEPS-
IC) indicate that individual and family 
premiums grew by 5.0 and 7.5 percent 
respectively in Massachusetts vs. 3.2 and 
6.1 percent respectively in the United 
States between 2005 and 2006.36 The 
underlying reasons for spending growth 
in Massachusetts are, in part, the same 
as those affecting the nation as a whole, 
e.g., increases in chronic illness, the 
growth in technology, the increasing 
costs of prescription drugs, and so on. 
However, the fact that costs are increas-
ing faster in Massachusetts than in the 
rest of the country suggests that either 
utilization of existing services is increas-
ing faster, new technologies are being 
adopted and dispersed quicker, or pay-
ments to providers are growing faster 
than is the case elsewhere.
Massachusetts is also faced with 
market imperfections that are likely 
contributing to high health spending 
growth. The hospital/physician market 
in Massachusetts is highly concentrated, 
with several academic medical centers 
that are the dominant provider systems 
in their local markets. In general, these 
medical centers provide state-of-the-art 
care, employ cutting-edge technologies, 
have outstanding physician leadership 
and are leaders in introducing electronic 
medical records and care coordination 
programs. But there seems to be little 
evidence of active competition on 
cost and prices between the dominant 
players and with the other hospitals in 
their local markets; thus, cost growth in 
the state is driven by the market power 
of the leading health care systems.
Efforts by insurers to develop plans that 
do not include the dominant systems 
seem unlikely to be successful. For 
example, Len Nichols and colleagues 
report that the Partners’ system has 
successfully blocked efforts to develop 
tiered networks by “refusing to contract 
with any plans that would place them 
in a tier other than the preferred one.”37 
There is widespread demand on the 
part of employers and individuals to 
have the leading academic medical 
centers in their provider networks. 
This strong preference on the part of 
the purchasers of insurance makes it 
difficult for insurers to offer products 
with more limited networks and 
constrains them in rate negotiations. 
For example, in 2000, when the Tufts 
Health Plan balked at the rate increase 
demanded by the Partners’ system, 
Partners refused to contract with Tufts, 
leading the latter to accede to Partners’ 
demands to avoid the loss of members.38 
Other hospitals appear to be unable 
or unwilling to compete aggressively 
with the dominant players on price. 
Though hard to prove, they appear to 
be content with shadow pricing. 
The insurance market is also less than 
competitive. Blue Cross/Blue Shield has 
a dominant market share, accounting 
for over half the covered lives outside 
of MassHealth and the state employees’ 
health plan.39 Other insurers have a diffi-
cult time competing with Blue Cross be-
cause of its size, name recognition and 
ability to negotiate with multistate com-
panies. As a result, they do not seem to 
compete over premiums to gain market 
share. The lack of serious competition in 
the insurance market reduces the incen-
tive for the dominant insurer to use its 
market power in negotiations over rates 
with the major hospital systems.40
This problem is not unique in 
Massachusetts. Insurance markets in 
most states have become dominated 
by a small number of large insurers. 
For example, James C. Robinson 
found that in all but 14 states, three 
or fewer insurers accounted for 65 
percent of the commercial market in 
2003.41 Robinson found that 34 states 
had highly concentrated insurance 
markets, using standards established 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). He also found that medical 
costs grew considerably faster than 
inflation between 2000 and 2003 in 
the United States, but that private 
insurer revenue increased even faster. 
Thus the market power of insurers 
meant that they were not only able to 
pass on increasing health care costs 
to purchasers, but to increase their 
profitability at the same time.42
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Dominant insurers do not seem to 
be able or willing to use their market 
power to effectively negotiate with 
consolidated hospital systems. Hospital 
consolidation has expanded rapidly 
since about 1990 in response to the 
growing power of insurers.43 It is 
estimated that there has been a one-
third reduction in the number of local 
hospital systems since 1990 and that 
88 percent of large metropolitan areas 
now have highly concentrated hospital 
markets, based on measures used by 
the FTC and the DOJ.44 The results 
from several studies on the impact 
of market concentration suggest that 
hospital prices are considerably higher 
in highly concentrated markets than 
in others.45 This is particularly true in 
markets in which there are mergers 
among hospitals that are close to each 
other. One study estimated that such 
mergers increased prices by about 
40 percent over the long term for 
both the merged hospitals and their 
rivals in those markets.46 There is also 
evidence of shadow pricing in that rival 
hospitals have also increased prices in 
response to market consolidation.47 The 
increased concentration of both insurers 
and hospital markets means that the 
nation is not reaping the benefits of 
competition. 
These problems of concentrated 
market power, while not unique to 
Massachusetts, make it extremely 
difficult to address the growth in 
health care costs. The issues at stake 
in the control over health care costs 
are quite serious. With health care cost 
increases out-stripping growth in the 
state’s tax base, taxes will have to be 
increased to support both MassHealth 
and the low-income subsidies under 
CommCare. If it is politically infeasible 
to increase taxes, then either coverage 
must be cut back or the subsidies will 
not keep pace with the increasing costs 
of insurance, and many low-income 
people could become exempt from the 
mandate. Similarly, for those above 300 
percent of the FPL, those not eligible for 
subsidies, increasing health care costs 
relative to incomes would lead to many 
more people being exempted from the 
mandate. Gradually, the Massachusetts 
reform could unravel unless cost growth 
is controlled. 
Options for Addressing the 
Long-Term Cost Problem
There are several policy options that 
the state could consider. These include 
steps to spur the adoption of electronic 
health records, expand prevention 
efforts particularly in the area of obesity, 
and invest in chronic care management. 
But the evidence on the effectiveness 
of these measures is somewhat mixed 
and suggests that savings are likely to be 
small.48 More dramatic steps are likely to 
be necessary. In this section, we suggest 
four alternative proposals. We recognize 
that some of these proposals may not 
be politically feasible in the short term, 
but we believe that it is important that 
policymakers debate a range of options 
to assure the long-term viability of the 
reforms.
Managed Competition. 
The first option to address long-term 
cost issues is a managed competition 
model. In fact, the CommChoice 
program operates under just such 
a model. Under CommChoice, the 
Connector has established a set of rules 
that insurers must follow. Each plan 
must offer three options (in addition to a 
young adult policy) with premiums that 
vary with out-of- pocket cost exposure; 
provider networks may also vary. The 
three options are priced to reflect the 
actuarial values of the plans, not the 
risks presented by those who enroll. 
That is, the difference in premiums 
between a comprehensive plan and a 
lower-actuarial-value plan reflects only 
the differences due to plan generosity, 
not differences in the risk of enrollees 
in the different plans.49 But individuals 
choosing more comprehensive benefits 
or plans with more inclusive provider 
networks pay the full additional costs 
of those upgrades. Thus there is an 
incentive for individuals to choose plans 
with more tightly managed care, with 
higher out-of-pocket costs or with more 
restricted networks. The intent is to 
make individuals more cost conscious 
in their purchase of insurance and 
health services, thus putting pressure on 
providers to hold down costs. 
There are two serious problems with 
this model, however. First, CommChoice 
is too small at this point to effectively 
drive the market, having only 18,000 
covered lives. The Connector’s market 
power is enhanced because insurers 
must price products offered outside the 
Connector at the same premiums, but it 
is still limited. Second, there is limited 
competition in the hospital markets. 
If insurers now do not have enough 
market power to control provider 
utilization and prices, it is difficult 
to see how individuals facing higher 
out-of-pocket costs could do so. That 
is, while individuals in principle can 
change insurers in response to higher 
premiums, it is not clear that this will 
mean that insurers will negotiate more 
effectively with providers.
There is one obvious solution to 
address the first of these problems. That 
would be to open up CommChoice 
and CommCare to all employers, not 
simply those with 50 or fewer workers. 
Any employer who can do better 
financially by purchasing through the 
Connector could do so. Ideally, the 
firewall between CommChoice and 
CommCare plans would be eliminated. 
All individuals could be allowed to 
choose among any of these plans, 
but with the subsidies for the low-
income population tied to the more 
comprehensive CommCare plans. Low-
income workers whose employers make 
health insurance contributions for them 
would apply those contributions to the 
CommCare plans, receiving government 
subsidies on the remaining premiums 
when appropriate. In this way, workers 
with incomes below 300 percent of the 
FPL working in offering firms would 
no longer be shut out of CommCare’s 
comprehensive low-cost sharing plans at 
very affordable prices. Employers would 
be required to make the same premium 
contribution on behalf of each worker 
and would not be allowed to offer a plan 
both outside the Connector and inside 
the Connector. The largest employers 
presumably have the efficiencies of 
large group purchases and lower 
administrative costs and would not be 
attracted to the Connector in any event, 
but many other employers would be. 
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This approach would also mean that 
more lower-income individuals would be 
eligible for CommCare subsidies giving 
the state a one time bump in subsidy 
costs; however, the increase would be 
small. Since employers would have to 
make the same premium contribution to 
all workers, the income- related subsidies 
in the Connector would only apply to 
the employee’s share. 
While any increases in subsidies 
would be difficult in the current fiscal 
environment, over the long term it 
would give the Connector significantly 
more size and allow the managed 
competition model to fully evolve. 
The larger Connector plans could 
increase insurer negotiating power 
with providers, although, as discussed 
previously, that will not necessarily lead 
to insurers being more successful in 
such negotiations. But such a strategy 
could reveal the extent to which the 
fixed employer contribution approach 
would lead to individuals choosing 
more cost-effective plans, thus putting 
pressure on insurers to contain price 
and utilization of services.
A New Public Insurance Option. 
A second strategy to address long-term 
cost issues is for the state to develop 
a new public health insurance option 
open to the subsidized and unsubsidized 
populations that would operate similarly 
to the traditional Medicare program. 
The notion is like that espoused by 
President-elect Barack Obama and 
Senator Hillary Clinton in the recent 
Democratic primary.50 The plan could 
adopt Medicare payment rules that 
would perhaps pay, at least initially, 
above Medicare levels. MassHealth 
payment rates could be aligned with 
those of the new state plan, though 
payment rates would at least initially 
be lower. Some providers may be 
unwilling to participate. But since most 
participate in MassHealth and Medicare, 
this seems unlikely since the new plan 
would pay higher rates. In principle, 
providers that participate in MassHealth 
could be required to participate in the 
new public plan or face penalties, but 
that will likely be unnecessary. The 
new state plan would be responsible 
for claims payment, utilization review, 
development of disease management 
and chronic care coordination 
programs, and so on. The basic intent 
is to use the power of a large strong 
buyer to bring down provider payment 
rates.51 The new plan could be offered 
as the only plan in CommCare or as a 
plan that would compete with existing 
plans. It could also be offered as well 
as an option within CommChoice, 
to individuals and employers who 
purchase coverage through the 
Connector, and to state employees.
Because the state funded plan would 
be offered as a choice, employers and 
individuals would be free to choose a 
private insurance plan. It is likely that 
many employers and individuals would 
choose other insurance products, but 
the presence of the state plan would 
force insurers to compete with a plan 
with strong bargaining power and, as 
an arm of state government, a powerful 
financial interest in containing costs. 
Only those private plans with the 
ability to compete would survive. At the 
same time, a strong public plan cannot 
afford to seriously underpay providers 
because it will have responsibility for 
the viability and stability of the state’s 
health system. 
The Connector as Negotiator. 
The third alternative is to have the 
Connector negotiate on behalf of all 
CommCare and CommChoice plans 
over hospital and physician rates. The 
underlying assumption is that current 
insurers are unable or unwilling to exert 
market power and, thus, are not able 
to control health care spending in the 
state. The Connector might by joined by 
the Group Insurance Commission (the 
state employee plan) and MassHealth 
to jointly negotiate over rates. This 
alternative would be more effective if 
the Connector were opened up to larger 
firms or even to all residents to provide 
more leverage with providers. Again, 
individuals would not be required to 
choose a plan within the Connector; 
however, Connector plans would likely 
have the advantage of lower premiums 
due to its greater negotiating power. 
The cost control under this approach 
would extend beyond the plans offered 
within the Connector because it would 
put competitive pressures on other 
plans to control health care spending. 
Failure to do so by those plans would 
mean that employers and individuals 
would increasingly migrate to the plans 
offered through the Connector. Efforts 
by hospitals to shift costs to plans 
outside the Connector would likely be 
in vain, since doing so would increase 
premiums in those plans and lead more 
people to enroll in Connector plans. 
This model could result in strong cost 
containment incentives without forcing 
all providers to live with the same rates 
for all payers. 
All-Payer Rate-Setting 
The fourth alternative, and one likely 
to engender the most controversy, is 
for the state to return to an all-payer 
rate-setting system that determines 
payments to hospitals, doctors, and 
other providers. The payment system 
would generally follow Medicare 
principles, paying some percentage 
above Medicare rates and controlling the 
rate of growth in prices over time. All 
payers would be required to use these 
rates, applying them to all providers 
and for the benefit of all individuals. 
MassHealth rates would be gradually 
improved, bringing their rates up to 
the same level as other insurers for all 
providers. Technical adjustments would 
be necessary to account for hospitals’ 
teaching and uncompensated care 
responsibilities. This option is different 
than the third alternative as the rates 
would apply throughout the state health 
care system, instead of only to those 
plans providing coverage through the 
Connector (and, potentially, the state 
employees plan and MassHealth). 
All-payer rate-setting systems have 
not always been successful (Maryland 
is the only surviving system from all 
those implemented in the 1980s), but 
the stakes are much greater now. While 
controversial, all-payer systems have the 
potential to effectively control hospital 
and physician payment rates and could 
be the difference between the failure 
of the Massachusetts reform effort and 
its success. A major disadvantage is the 
constant threat of providers lobbying the 
legislature, thus weakening rate-setting 
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pressures. This threat exists in the two 
previous models as well but would likely 
be greater in an all-payer system because 
there is no alternative for providers but 
to accept the system’s rates. 
While it has substantial cost-saving 
potential, regulatory approaches 
like all-payer rate-setting require the 
state to take on huge responsibilities, 
necessitating that the state balance the 
desire for cost control with the need to 
maintain the financial viability of the 
health care system.
Other Issues
Besides the cost issues, there are some 
remaining problems with the basic 
design of the Massachusetts approach. 
While these could be remedied, it would 
mean increased costs to the state. First, 
only adults are subject to the mandate. 
Extending the mandate to children 
would move toward universal coverage 
for that population. The remaining 
number of uninsured children is 
relatively small, but it is odd that they 
have not been subject to the mandate. 
Second, the structure of the subsidy 
schedule results in people just above 
300 percent of the FPL finding coverage 
unaffordable, and substantial numbers 
of this income group are exempt 
from the mandate. This number could 
grow in the future as health care 
costs increase relative to income. An 
alternative subsidization approach 
is for the state to pay the difference 
between the lowest cost premium in the 
CommChoice plan and the percentage 
of income dictated by the affordability 
schedule.For example, if the premiums 
for the benchmark plan were 10 
percent of income and the affordability 
schedule dictated that the individual 
pay no more than 7 percent of income 
for premiums, the government would 
pay the difference. The amount that 
the state would have to pay to partially 
subsidize this population would be 
relatively small, and it would ensure 
that no one would be exempt from the 
mandate. With such a provision the state 
could truly achieve universal coverage. 
Of course, if cost growth is not brought 
under control, then the difference 
between premiums and the affordability 
schedule will grow over time; thus, 
once again, cost control is vital.
Third, under the current structure, low-
income workers are disqualified from 
enrolling in CommCare’s subsidized 
insurance plans if their employers make 
even relatively modest contributions 
toward a health insurance plan at the 
workplace. They are, however, only 
required to take up their employer’s 
coverage if it is affordable. But this may 
leave low-income individuals uninsured 
who would otherwise be eligible for 
CommCare, simply as a consequence 
of their employers’ offer decisions. 
Ideally, these individuals would be 
allowed to enroll in CommCare and 
bring their employer’s health insurance 
contribution to the program. The 
employer’s contribution could offset 
a portion of the government’s cost of 
providing coverage, and the individual 
could be appropriately subsidized on the 
remainder of the CommCare premium. 
While the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) prohibits the state 
from requiring an employer to make 
such a contribution to CommCare, 
the employer should be indifferent 
between an individual worker using the 
contribution for the firm’s plan or for 
CommCare. Consequently, it is likely to 
be almost as effective to merely provide 
the employer the option of doing so for 
its workers. If an employer chooses to 
do so, it could make its health insurance 
contribution to CommCare on behalf 
of its income-eligible workers instead 
of using it to enroll the worker in 
the firm’s own plan. If the employer 
offered coverage to its workers but 
did not choose to make CommCare 
available to low-income employees, 
those employees would not be eligible 
for the subsidized program. This option 
could lead to substantially increased 
insurance affordability for low-income 
workers in offering firms, while keeping 
the employer health insurance dollars 
in the system.
Fourth, for those with modest 
incomes but who do not qualify for 
the CommCare program (i.e., those 
between 300 and 400 percent of the 
FPL), the bronze CommChoice plans 
carry potentially large out-of-pocket 
liabilities relative to their incomes. Most 
bronze plans have $4,000-$5,000 out-of-
pocket maximums ($5,000 is 16 percent 
of income for a single adult just above 
300 percent of the FPL, $4,000 is about 
13 percent of income), and not all co-
payment responsibilities count against 
those maximums. The cost-relative-to-
income problem could be addressed by 
additional subsidization for high medical 
need, modest-income persons above 300 
percent of the FPL, say by limiting the 
out-of-pocket liabilities in bronze plans 
for those between 300 and 500 percent 
of the FPL. 
Conclusion
Massachusetts has successfully 
implemented major health reform 
legislation. It has established the 
Connector, which makes both 
subsidized and nonsubsidized products 
available, and has begun to enforce an 
individual mandate. The number of 
uninsured has fallen dramatically, and 
there is also evidence of improvement 
in access to health care across a wide 
variety of measures. Public support for 
the health reforms remains high. 
At the same time, the state has been 
faced with unexpectedly high costs. 
These are related in part to higher 
than expected enrollment growth in 
CommCare, but are also due to other 
factors, such as adverse selection into 
the pool, underestimates of the low-
income uninsured population, and 
a subsidy schedule that was more 
generous than originally anticipated. 
These short-term problems will fade 
as the program matures. But the state 
faces long-term problems related to the 
high cost of health care in the state. 
Massachusetts health care costs are 
high and have been growing at least as 
fast as those in the United States, with 
health insurance premiums increasing 
even more rapidly. A higher share of 
health care costs in the state compared 
to the United States as a whole occurs in 
hospitals. 
The underlying reasons for general 
health care cost growth are the 
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growth in new technologies (including 
pharmaceuticals) and the increase 
in chronic illness; these are issues 
throughout the United States. The 
cost problems in Massachusetts are 
exacerbated by the market power of a 
number of academic medical centers 
and a lack of serious competition in both 
the insurance and hospital markets. 
These problems are not unique to 
Massachusetts; there has been growing 
concentration in both the insurance 
and hospital markets throughout the 
country. There is increasing evidence 
that growing concentration, particularly 
on the provider side, is a significant 
contributor to health care cost growth. 
We discussed four options for 
controlling health care costs. The first 
is to expand the role of the Connector, 
opening it up to more businesses 
and individuals so that a managed 
competition model may be adequately 
tested. The market could reduce cost 
growth by making individuals more cost 
conscious. It is not clear, however, that 
individuals behaving more economically 
can offset the problems of market 
power and limited competition in the 
insurance and hospital markets. 
The second alternative is for the state 
to develop a public health insurance 
plan that is open to the subsidized and 
unsubsidized populations and would 
compete with existing health plans in 
MassHealth, CommCare, CommChoice, 
and the state employees’ health 
plan. The public plan would use its 
bargaining power to constrain provider 
rates, institute cost-effective treatment 
protocols, and, thus, introduce more 
effective competition in the market. 
A third alternative is to have the 
Connector/state negotiate hospital 
rates and physician fees on behalf of 
plans participating in CommCare, 
CommChoice, and, perhaps, the state 
employees’ plan, as well as MassHealth. 
The goal would be to amass significant 
bargaining power to allow the 
Connector to gain control relative to 
hospitals and physicians. Individuals and 
firms could still choose other insurance 
plans. The final alternative goes the 
farthest and would have the state return 
to an all-payer rate-setting system. The 
state would constrain rates paid by 
all payers (other than Medicare) to all 
providers on behalf of all individuals.
In addition to cost containment 
alternatives, we suggest that the 
state take the final steps in moving to 
universal coverage by extending the 
mandate to children, restructuring 
subsidies to provide some financial help 
to those above 300 percent of the FPL, 
and addressing the equity issue that 
exists when employees are required to 
take up their employer’s coverage even 
when, given their incomes, they would 
be eligible for subsidies in CommCare. 
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